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Abstract
Purpose – In relation to the critical problem, this paper aims to present an understanding of the agency
theory and the stakeholder theory from the perspective of the Islamic principles. Indeed, a thorough
examination of the theoretical background explaining corporate governance from the Islamic perspective is
necessary to conduct research analysing corporate governance in Islamic banks.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors followed a critical review discussion; this method takes
into consideration presenting important theories and comparing those theories with Islamic perspective.
Findings – The authors presented important arguments on the difference between ordinary theories to
explaining corporate governance and Islamic perspective. The paper browsed into whether the Shariah
Supervisory Board is a fit with the agency theory by explaining the agency theory and how it differs from the
Islamic banking concepts. The paper involved an analytical review on stakeholder theory and presented a
critique and the rationale as to why there is ample room for the Shariah Supervisory Board to be considered a
fit with the stakeholder theory, as the Shariah Supervisory Board is an independent body influencing the firm.
Originality/value – The paper is of important value to those conducting research in the area of governance
in Islamic banks; they may find it beneficial in terms of underlining theory building their research framework.
Keywords Corporate governance, Performance, Islamic banks, Islamic perspective,
Shariah supervisory board (SSB)
Paper type General review
1. Introduction
In relation to the critical problem, this paper presents an understanding of the agency theory
and the stakeholder theory from the perspective of the Islamic principles. Indeed, a thorough
examination of the theoretical background explaining corporate governance from the
Islamic perspective is necessary to conduct research analysing corporate governance in
Islamic banks.
Section 1 explains the concept of the agency theory using an Islamic micro view and
determines whether the agency theory could be the appropriate fit in terms of explaining the
Islamic banks’ corporate governance.
Section 2 will explain the stakeholder theory and will link it with the Islamic perspective
and the issues of governance. Indeed, this section will provide a discussion to enable an
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understanding of the linkages between the stakeholders from the Islamic perspective of
corporate governance in Islamic banks.
Section 3 provides a discussion in relation to the stakeholder theory in relation to the
Shariah Supervisory Board. The Shariah Supervisory Board’s role is to advise and supervise
the operation of a firm to ensure that it complies with the Shariah principles and the section
outlines the role of the Shariah Supervisory Board in relation to performance. For the
purposes of this paper, a firm represents an Islamic bank.
The final section will provide the rationale for focusing on one theory over another in
terms of the Islamic perspective of corporate governance, and it also will explain the reasons
the other theories have been discounted.
2. Review of the relevant literature
From an examination of the literature, the agency theory in relation to corporate governance
refers to the contradiction of the principal and the manager in relation to their interest. The
principal as the owner is expected to have the necessary capital to start the business but may
not have the sufficient ability and skills required to run the operations. Therefore, the owner
can elect to hire a professional manager to run the business. The relationship between both
parties is subject to different opinions, and the owner has a focus on increasing the level of
profit, whereas the manager may have the intention to improve the business as whole. Thus,
the corporate governance guidelines are an effective tool to monitor and to minimise any
conflict between the parties. Effective corporate governance mechanisms will allow
monitoring to minimise problems arising from the principals on the ownership side, and
managers on the side of the agent. Furthermore, the mechanisms of corporate governance
involve proper capital adequacy and disclosure guidelines and proper processes applied for
the appointment of board directors and for committees.
However, there is a problem with the agency theory, in that reality sometimes
deviates from what is proposed, and researchers have related the performance failure
and bankruptcy of companies to the failure of corporate governance guidelines and the
agency theory. In fact, the owners may not actually be monitoring the company; instead,
they are focused on dividends and for an improvement in the shares prices. Indeed, there
not only is a single owner but also are plenty of shareholders who purchase shares via
fund managers; thus, fund managers can be seen as artificial owners. Therefore, there is
no principal acting as part of the process to monitor the company. Moreover, to explain
the relationship between governance and organisational performance using the agency
theory, there is a great possibility that researchers have not focused equally on parties
other than the principal and the agent, and there is a tendency to ignore the problem
arising from employees and suppliers, for example. It would be better to apply equal
attention to examining the internal and external auditing process as well. The critics
have explained they can act to provide strong evidence that the agency theory is not
suitable to fully explain the dimensions of governance in the finance-related studies
(Safieddine, 2009).
According to Grais and Pellegrini (2006), there is an important role for the Islamic
banking industry in relation to economic growth, and this role presents a need to give a
special attention to corporate governance in Islamic banks and the unique agency issues
faced by the Islamic banking sector all over the world. Moreover, the agency theory does
not adhere to the principles and character of Islamic law because the maximisation of the
shareholders’ profit is never the only target of the agency relationship. An agency
problem could arise from the risk of manipulating the returns of funds deposited, as the






































whereby the return could be fixed (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998), provided that the
existence of an independent body named the Shariah Supervisory Board makes it a
matter beyond the agency relationship. Karim (2001) argued that Islamic banks adopt
different accounting treatments for investment accounts. While some banks report these
treatments as equity or liabilities, others report them as an off-balance sheet item, which
permits them to hide any negative information related to investment accounts, such as
losses due to misconduct or negligence (Karim, 2001). Indeed, a specific mechanism has
also been suggested to bridge the gap between the cash flow and the control rights of the
board of directors. Archer et al. (1998) highlighted the role of “vicarious” monitoring
undertaken by shareholders on behalf of the board of directors to prevent a firm’s
management-level from exposing funds to intolerable levels of risk. These shareholders
are driven by their desire to attract more investment accounts and to increase their own
returns. Asri and Fahmi (2003) proposed a governance framework consisting of a group
of shura (consultants), including representatives of the shareholders, creditors, the
public, the board of directors and the Shariah Supervisory Board.
Sultan et al. (2013) presented a critique regarding the agency theory and the theory of
contract in Islam, and they made an assessment of the understanding of the agency
problems in Islamic law and also the agency problems from the conventional
perspective, emphasising the implicit and hidden goals that could cause hazard to
different parties in an organisational sense. Hence, they suggested the applicability of
epistemology as another form of theory explaining the agency relationship in the
contract.
A unit of knowledge, maslaha and Shariah objectives are three key factors that
determine the importance of any Islamic finance activities in accordance with
Choudhury (2014) who explained the rationale for a causality relationship between
Islamic law and the practices of Islamic finance, with such a relationship translated by
way of the structure of Islamic banks. Therefore, there is a great need for an external
body of experts to monitor the activities of Islamic finance to ensure there is adherence
to the rules of maslaha and the Shariah objectives.
3. The stakeholder theory, corporate governance and the Islamic perspective
Unlike the agency theory, the stakeholder theory argues that not only are the owners and
managers the important parties of the firm but also there are other parties involved, and
this includes the suppliers, customers and sometimes competitors. The involvement of
the other parties is derived from their ability to influence the firm. Indeed, since the
introduction of the stakeholder theory, it became the underlying foundation of many of
the governance-related research endeavours. Much of the research deals with
understanding strategic management. However, the critics maintain there is a problem
in relation to the stakeholder theory and the inability of the theory to understand the
deals made and the compromises that could happen amongst the stakeholders
themselves.
In considering the stakeholder theory as the underlying foundation for the
governance–performance relationship, an allowance should be made in the model for the
Shariah Supervisory Board, and this allowance ought to relate to the principles of
accountability and supervision in Islamic law, where its role is to prohibit religious
board members to align their decisions to suit managers and the shareholders’ interests;
instead, their role is aligned to the principles of Shariah. Therefore, there is a problem







































ample room in the stakeholder theory to provide an understanding of the Shariah
Supervisory Board’s position in Islamic financial institutions.
4. The stakeholder theory in relation to the Shariah supervisory board
The Islamic view regarding the Stakeholder Theory provides a comprehensive
validation regarding the capabilities of stakeholders and the responsibilities that both
the firm and their various stakeholders have to fulfil to meet the appropriate guidelines.
These guidelines are recognised in the Islamic principles of property rights and
contracts as presented by Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004). Therefore, a firm has the
responsibility to conserve the inviolability of implied contracts by recognising the
property rights of all applicable stakeholders such as customers, consumers, suppliers,
employees and local communities. These property rights are granted and preserved by
the Shariah which endorses social order and economic development.
The stakeholder theory claims that all parties that affect a firm’s performance are
important to the success of the firm. These parties could be suppliers, trade associations,
customers and so forth. Figure 1 presents the potential stakeholders in a firm, and, in the
context of this study, the firm is an Islamic bank, and, its needs, according to Donaldson
and Preston (1995), should be taken into consideration to ensure the optimal outcome.
The role of the Islamic Shariah Supervisory Board is to advise and supervise the
operation of a firm to ensure that it complies with the Shariah principles. The board of
directors, acting on behalf of the shareholders, has the duty to monitor and oversee the
overall business activities, whereas the managers have a fiduciary duty to manage the firm
as a trust, on behalf of all the stakeholders and not just for the benefit of the shareholders. The
duty of the other stakeholders such as the employees, the depositors and the customers is to
fulfil all of their contractual obligations. In addition, the state of a stakeholder will be
considered as will the external institution which provides the regulatory framework and its
enforcement. The Shariah Supervisory Board plays an important role in influencing Islamic
banks’ performance, whereas the stakeholder theory provides the basis to determine whether
the Shariah Supervisory Board is an affecting party in the performance of the Islamic banks.
A discussion of corporate governance in the Islamic-based literature confirms the
differences between the western corporate governance and the Islamic corporate governance
(Hasan, 2009). Researchers of banking systems have been calling for a more comprehensive
Islamic framework that takes into consideration both regulatory and moral aspects of
governance (Abdul Rahman, 1998). In an Islamic banking context, the establishment of a
Shariah Supervisory Board is essential, as transactions and activities of Islamic banks are
required to be approved by that authority. This suggests that the Shariah Supervisory Board
is one of the most important stakeholders in Islamic banking. Accordingly, it presents the
opportunity to use the stakeholder theory to explain the relationship between corporate
governance and banking performance.
The concepts of the stakeholder theory are increasingly applied in countries where
workers have a strong say concerning the operations of their organisations, such as in
countries like Germany, Sweden and Japan. The concepts enhance the ability of all the people
who have a stake in the organisation to participate in the organisation’s current and future
activities. In summary, the stakeholder theory is the best fit for the current study to use as a
basis for the analysis.
From the previous discussion, this study follows the steps of the stakeholder model in
examining the relationship between corporate governance and performance in Islamic






































contradictions in the existing literature have created ample room for further investigation in
the context of Islamic banking.
Four key stakeholders have been selected according to the Islamic stakeholder model as
having an influence on a bank in terms of its financial performance. These have been
identified as first the management – that is the duality of the role of Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), the board size (BOS) and its independence – and the other three factors have been
identified as the Shariah Supervisory Board factors (board independence, frequency of the
board meetings, experience of the board members and the board size), the ownership (large
shareholders) and whether there is a presence of an external auditor. Other factors are not
included in the literature review because they need a comprehensive and extensive
discussion.
The idea of religious supervision or control mechanisms came into existence with the
emergence of Islamic banking to ensure investors and other groups had confidence in the
Shariah-compliance of Islamic banks (Sulaiman Joriah, 2012). In Islamic banks, the Shariah









































Normally, the board of directors is elected by the shareholders to monitor an Islamic bank’s
activities. The board of directors is formed to ensure that the objectives and the activities of
an Islamic bank are aligned and to ensure that the senior level of managers behave in a way
that will provide the best value for shareholders. The board of directors formulates the
business strategy, appoints senior management and ensures the validity of information and
makes certain that the appropriate controls are in place including audit systems for
monitoring the bank’s performance.
A system of internal controls in the Islamic banks consists of policies and procedures
designed to provide management with a reasonable assurance that the bank can achieve its
objectives and goals (Beasley, 1996). The board of directors play an important role in the
operation of an Islamic bank, as it oversees the senior level of management. The board is
entrusted with the responsibilities of monitoring and supervising the bank’s resources and
operations (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). Therefore, collectively, the board is seen as a team of
individuals with fiduciary responsibilities of leading and directing an Islamic bank, with the
primary objective of protecting the interests of the shareholders of the organisation (Norita
and Shamsul Nahar, 2004).
An acceptable argument for debate could be identified as the exclusion of other factors
which may play an important role in determining the applicability of a relationship existence
between the independent variables and the dependent variable. A possible explanation could
be that the other factors involve an in-depth understanding of Shariah principles, whereby
mechanisms with the purpose of mitigating agency problems might lead to a divergence
from the Islamic principles of Shariah (Safieddine, 2009) which is not in the scope of the
current study and could be a limitation providing ample room for future study. Another
possible explanation is that further research could determine if organisations that opt for

























































stable periods on issues in which the importance of the legal protection of minority
shareholders has been demonstrated (Mitton, 2002).
The roles of SSB in supervising Islamic banks are governed and guided by countries’
central banks; these roles relate to the assurance that Islamic principles are not breached
or neglected upon implementing banking business. The nature of SSB roles is
categorised based on two levels – Macro level which considers the general
harmonisation decisions at the central banks and Micro level which concentrate on
internal bank issues such as product development, approval of Zakat and issuance of
Shariah compliance certification. Worth noting, some countries such as Iran, Sudan,
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia created their slight differences in the approaches
which govern SSB activities. Therefore, a common set of standards which act as a
guideline have been proposed and formed under an origination named as the Islamic
Financial Service Board (IFSB) which enhances the stability of Islamic financial
activities and industry by issuing guidelines for the industry, by April 2016 IFSB
managed to get 116 total members who applied to implement the guidelines; these











































However, SSB is one of the stakeholders of the bank, the nature of their decision may
influence the acceptance of one product over another, decisions are debated on board of
directors’ level as well as internal auditing level. Therefore, SSB certification of approval
could increase or decrease the volume of banking business. Indeed, if a new product is sent
for approval to SSB, they have to deliberate based on their understanding; if it complies with
Shariah, they will accept, but, if it does not comply, they may ask for modification or reject.
The management has no right to involve in the decision. However, there are some arguments
over SSB may be willing to please management.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to shed light on the theoretical status of the Shariah Supervisory
Board in relation to governance of Islamic banks, and the paper browsed into whether the
Shariah Supervisory Board is a fit with the agency theory by explaining the agency theory
and how it differs from the Islamic banking concepts. The paper involved an analytical
review on stakeholder theory and presented a critique and the rationale as to why there is
ample room for the Shariah Supervisory Board to be considered a fit with the stakeholder
theory, as the Shariah Supervisory Board is an independent body influencing the firm.
However, there is a need to quantify the role played by the Shariah Supervisory Board in
relation to the value of the firm as well as Shariah Supervisory Board’s relationship with
other stakeholders.
In conclusion, in relation to this paper, empirical future research on the quantification of
the activities of the Shariah Supervisory Board should be implemented to justify the
existence of the specific characteristics of Islamic finance. However, this characteristic does
not necessarily fit with the background of the agency theory nor is it a stakeholder of the
conventional concepts.
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